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Vietnam stands out among nations for the rapid pace of its economic
growth and development. In the mid-1980s, Vietnam was considered a devel-
oping country.1 However, it was reclassified as a middle-income country in
2010.2 Indeed its rapid pace of development has led to Vietnam being de-
clared a “development success story.”3 New trade agreements that Vietnam
enters into should be assessed for their impact, if any, on Vietnam’s ability to
implement national intellectual property laws and policies suitable to its do-
mestic conditions and which contribute to the nation’s continued social and
economic development. This article will discuss the enforcement provisions
found in Articles 18.71–18.76 of the intellectual property chapter of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that were publicly available at the time of
writing.4 After the United States withdrew from the TPP in January 2017, the
remaining countries continued to negotiate a version of the TPP without the
United States.5 In January 2018, the remaining TPP parties concluded an
agreement called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
* Associate Professor of Law at Florida International University College of Law.
1. See About Vietnam, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://www.vn.undp
.org/content/vietnam/en/home/countryinfo.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Feb. 4, 2016,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partner-
ship/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP] (TPP concluded at New Zealand, February
2016). The United States withdrew from the TPP in January 2017. See Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., The United States Officially Withdraws
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Jan. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/pol-
icy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP.
5. Alexandra Stevenson & Motoko Rich, Trans-Pacific Trade Partners Are Mov-
ing On, Without the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/11/11/business/trump-tpp-trade.html.
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Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).6 While the CPTPP is expected to contain many
similar or identical provisions as the TPP, some provisions have changed.7
Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, and has
had to comply with the WTO intellectual property obligations since that
time.8 The TPP intellectual property chapter increases the scope and level of
intellectual property protection that was previously prescribed under the
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS).9 For instance, it extends trademark protection to sound
marks,10 increases the copyright term to a minimum of life of the author plus
seventy years,11 and provides protection for undisclosed test data that was
submitted for marketing approval.12 Interestingly, the TPP also addresses
other non-traditional subject matter, and includes a provision regarding coop-
eration on traditional knowledge.13 Furthermore, the TPP includes obliga-
tions that are similar to those found in other international intellectual
property agreements.14 For example, the TPP contains requirements regard-
ing technological protection measures, which mirror the obligations found in
the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty.15
As the other conference participants will analyze these substantive
changes, the discussion here will be limited to the civil enforcement provi-
6. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng
(noting that the agreement was concluded with Canada and ten other countries
on January 23, 2018).
7. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, An-
nex II, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-com
merce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/annex2-annexe
2.aspx?lang=eng.
8. See Vietnam Joins WTO with Director-General’s Tribute for True Grit, WTO:
2007 NEWS ITEMS (Jan. 11, 2007), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news
07_e/acc_vietnam_11jan07_e.htm.
9. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
10. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.18.
11. Id. art. 18.63.
12. Id. art. 18.50.
13. Id. art. 18.16.
14. See, e.g., 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105–17, 36 I.L.M. 65.
15. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.68. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) may also have some similar provisions, however, as Vietnam is not a
party to that agreement, the ACTA will not be discussed here. See generally
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Oct. 1,
2011, https://ustr.gov/acta (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
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sions of the TPP. The TPP enforcement provisions are significant not only
because of the requirements themselves, but also because the intellectual
property obligations under the TPP are consistent with the “upward ratchet”
trend in international intellectual property law.16 The question is whether, at
this stage in Vietnam’s development, this agreement will enable the country
to implement domestic intellectual property policy that supports Vietnam’s
development objectives.
It is worth noting that Vietnam’s existing trade agreement with the Eu-
ropean Union also contains an intellectual property chapter.17 Though the
EU-Vietnam agreement is not in force, like the TPP, it builds on the WTO
TRIPS Agreement.18 Thus, Vietnam’s intellectual property may be impacted
by both of  these trade agreements. The intellectual property provisions of
these two agreements have differences that are worth examining. Given the
narrow scope of this topic, this article does not provide an analysis of the
similarities and differences between these two agreements, but will instead
contemplate the language of the enforcement provisions in the TPP’s intel-
lectual property chapter and how these obligations differ from Vietnam’s ex-
isting obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agreement.
II. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE ENFORCEMENT
OBLIGATIONS?
The TRIPS enforcement provisions are relatively general in comparison
to the TPP. TRIPS requires members to ensure that their laws will “permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights
covered by this Agreement.”19 The procedures must be fair and equitable,
and damages and injunctions must be available.20
The TRIPS Agreement seeks to create effective deterrents to infringe-
ment,21 while the TPP creates more robust and detailed obligations. Mirror-
ing the language of TRIPS, the TPP requires that member states ensure that
16. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPs Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs,
ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 449 (2011).
17. See EU-Vietnam Trade Agreement 2016, EUR. COMM’N, http://trade.ec.europa
.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154223.%20institutional%20-%20GIs%
206.5a3%206.11wg%20rev2%20-%20for%20publication.pdf (last visited Feb.
21, 2018).
18. See id.
19. TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 41.
20. Id. arts. 42, 44, 45.
21. Id. art. 46 (“In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to
be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the
channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the
right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional require-
ments, destroyed.”).
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their enforcement procedures effectively prevent the infringement of intellec-
tual property and deter future infringements.22 The footnote to this obligation
clarifies that remedies shall be available to both state owned and private en-
terprises.23 This requirement prevents member states from engaging in state-
sanctioned infringement.
The TPP also includes a requirement of “proportionality,” which weighs
the seriousness of the infringement, the applicable remedies, and the interests
of third parties.24 This appears to create an additional balancing provision for
enforcement of intellectual property rights. It could mean tougher sanctions
for more serious infringement, but it leaves room for reduced penalties for
infringement that may be perceived as less significant. In addition, the inter-
est of third parties, which could include access to cultural works, for exam-
ple, could be taken into consideration as part of the balancing test.
The TPP expressly contemplates enforcement in the digital era, stating
that the enforcement provisions are equally applicable to trademark infringe-
ment and copyright infringement in the digital environment.25 Further, it cre-
ates presumptions that benefit rights holders. For instance, it is to be
presumed, absent evidence to the contrary, that the author, producer, per-
former, or publisher is the rights holder.26 In addition, it is to be presumed
that copyright subsists in the work, and that a registered trademark is prima
facie valid.27 Similarly, where a patent has been “substantively examined and
granted by the competent authority of a Party,” that Party shall provide that
each claim of the patent is prima facie valid.28 As such, those seeking to
challenge the validity of patents, trademarks and copyrights bear the burden
of adducing evidence to rebut the prima facie presumption of validity.29
Another interesting aspect of the enforcement chapter is that, in addition
to the requirement for reasoned, published judicial decisions, the parties ex-
pressly recognize the importance of collecting information and statistical data
regarding intellectual property infringement and the best practices for com-
bating infringement.30 Moreover, the member states are obligated to publish
information regarding their efforts to effectively enforce intellectual property
rights within their borders.31 This will force member states to collect and
22. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.71.
23. Id. art. 18.71 n.101.
24. Id. art. 18.71(5).
25. Id. art. 18.71(2).
26. Id.
27. Id. arts. 18.71(2)–(3).
28. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.72(3).
29. See id.
30. Id. art. 18.73(2).
31. Id. art. 18.73(3).
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publish the kind of information that the United States Trade Representative
uses in its annual Special 301 Report.32 As a result, it will be more difficult
for nations to claim to provide effective intellectual property protection if
they fail to demonstrate adequate enforcement. This is especially true be-
cause nations must include an explanation of their efforts to deter
infringement.33
Like TRIPS, the TPP expressly states that it does not create any obliga-
tion regarding the distribution of resources between the enforcement of intel-
lectual property obligations and the enforcement of the law in general.34
Despite this provision, and in light of the nature of the obligations under the
TPP, it is inevitable that TPP member states will have to redirect some re-
sources to intellectual property monitoring and enforcement.
As is the case under TRIPS, damages and injunctive relief must be
available. The general damages obligation in Article 18.74(3) of the TPP
mirrors that found in Article 45 of TRIPS. In addition, the TPP specifies that
the measure of value the rights holder submits, including the suggested retail
price or market price, can be considered in assessing damages.35 With respect
to copyright and trademark, the TPP requires that statutory damages, as well
as punitive and exemplary damages, be available to the right holder.36 This
provision is significant because it is not common for nations to provide statu-
tory damages for copyright infringement37 and punitive damages are not stan-
dard in copyright legislation.38
Like TRIPS, the TPP mandates provisional measures and border mea-
sures. TPP parties must ensure that any suspected counterfeit or confusingly
similar trademark goods or pirated copyrighted works can be detained at the
border. The right holder must supply evidence that there is prima facie in-
fringement.39 In line with the objective of deterring infringement, the TPP
goes beyond the TRIPS obligation regarding the information that must be
made available to the rights holder. Once goods are detained at the border,
the rights holder may be informed of the names and addresses of exporters,
32. See 2016 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Apr. 2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf.
33. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.73(2).
34. See id. art. 18.71(4)(b).
35. Id. art. 18.74(4).
36. Id. arts. 18.74(6)–(7) nn.111–12.
37. See Pamela Samuelson et al., Statutory Damages: A Rarity in International
Copyright Law, But for How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 521
(2013).
38. See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, Punitive Damages in Copyright Infringement Ac-
tions Under the US Copyright Act, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 108 (2009).
39. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.76(1)–(2).
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importers, consignors and consignees, the country of origin of the goods, and
the description of the goods.
But, this is not a mandatory obligation under the TPP, except with re-
spect to imported goods. In that case, the authorities must be able to provide
this information to the rights holder within thirty working days of seizing the
goods, or make a determination that the goods are counterfeit or pirated.40
According to the United States Trade Representative, the TPP enforcement
provisions close loopholes and make it possible to tackle the supply chains.41
This provision facilitates the ability of rights holders to identify and pursue
individuals who are involved in trafficking counterfeit or pirated goods. By
comparison, TRIPS requires that the rights holder be notified, but does not
obligate member states to advise the right holder of the names and addresses
of the importers of the goods.42
Whereas TRIPS provides for the disposal of goods outside the channels
of commerce, or their destruction if such destruction is constitutionally per-
missible,43 the TPP requires that competent authorities have unlimited power
to order the destruction of infringing goods.44 If they are not destroyed, they
can be disposed of outside the channels of commerce.45 In addition, the pro-
vision on border measures applies to goods of a commercial nature that are
sent in small consignments.46 This helps to ensure that counterfeiters do not
circumvent the border measures by sending the goods in shipments of small
quantities. Further, border agents must have the authority to seize infringing
goods of their own accord.
Notably, the TPP contains its own dispute settlement procedure. This
means that, like WTO member states, the TPP member states can use the
TPP process to resolve disputes.47 This process gives the TPP obligations
“teeth” insofar as members can be penalized for failure to comply with their
TPP obligations.48
40. Id. art. 18.76(4).
41. U.S. TRADE REP., Intellectual Property Executive Summary, TPP Made in
America, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Intellectual-
Property.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
42. See TRIPS, supra note 9, arts. 51, 54.
43. Id. art. 46.
44. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.76(7).
45. Id.
46. Id. art. 18.76(9).
47. See id. art. 28.3.
48. See, e.g., id. art. 28.20 (providing for the suspension of benefits if, following a
dispute settlement process, a nation refuses to bring its law into compliance).
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III. CONSIDERING THE ENFORCEMENT OBLIGATIONS
IN CONTEXT
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires
international agreements to be interpreted in light of their context.49 Thus, the
TPP intellectual property enforcement obligations must be interpreted in light
of its preamble, its objectives and principles in the intellectual property chap-
ter, and the TPP as a whole.50
In some ways, the TPP intellectual property chapter creates space for
greater flexibility than what was available under TRIPS, despite the ex-
panded intellectual property protections. For instance, the objectives and
principles of the agreement expand the flexibilities under TRIPS to expressly
allow member states to take measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual
property rights that adversely affect international technology transfer.51 Arti-
cle 18.3 of the TPP mirrors the language of balancing rights and obligations
currently found in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.
The TPP intellectual property obligations appear to be minimum stan-
dards since members can implement higher levels of intellectual property
protection than what is required by the agreement.52 However, the TPP ex-
pressly incorporates and expands the flexibilities that were built into TRIPS
and subsequent statements by WTO member states regarding the relationship
between intellectual property and public health.
In particular, Article 18.4 sets out the “understandings” in respect of the
intellectual property chapter by providing that the parties “recognise the need
to: (a) promote innovation and creativity; (b) facilitate the diffusion of infor-
mation, knowledge, technology, culture and the arts; and (c) foster competi-
tion and open and efficient markets.”53 This provision is explicit in
recognizing the importance of disseminating information and technology. Ar-
ticle 7 of TRIPS has been widely referenced as the provision that supports a
balancing test so that the interests of the rights holder are not necessarily
prioritized. Article 7 of TRIPS uses more general language than Article 18.4
of the TPP. Indeed, Article 7 of TRIPS is effectively reproduced in Article
18.3 of the TPP. Articles 18.3 of the TPP and Article 7 of TRIPS speak to a
balance of rights and obligations, taking into consideration the mutual benefit
of users and producers. However, Article 18.4 provides the scope for greater
flexibility with respect to the access issues that concern developing and
newly industrialized nations. For example, Vietnam has developed rapidly,
but continues to have large income disparities, so the ability to facilitate ac-
49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
50. See TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.76.
51. Id. arts. 18.2–18.3.
52. Id. art. 18.5.
53. Id. art. 18.4.
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cess to information and technology will be important in Vietnam’s future
development.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was
a major achievement for access advocates.54 It is significant, therefore, that
this declaration is expressly referenced, and its language reproduced in Arti-
cle 18.6 of the TPP.55 As part of the agreement, this provision could give
nations greater flexibility in protecting public health than was available under
TRIPS. In addition to the provisions discussed above, nations can draw on
Article 18.3, which allows member states to implement measures to protect
public health and the public interest in sectors that are of vital importance to
their socioeconomic and technological development when interpreting their
TPP enforcement obligations.56
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the TPP intellectual property enforcement provisions
strengthen the enforcement and deterrence obligations for TPP member
states. At the same time, Articles 18.3–18.6 offer flexibility to TPP member
states that is equivalent to, if not better than, that found in TRIPS. Whether
Vietnam will have adequate flexibility to implement and enforce its TPP in-
tellectual property obligations in a manner suitable to its domestic conditions
may depend on how much weight TPP panels give the economic interests of
the rights holders vis a vis other competing interests such as public health,
education, and technology transfer.
The enforcement provisions of the TPP agreement appear to give Viet-
nam sufficient flexibility to implement its national intellectual property laws
in a manner conducive to Vietnam’s continued progress.
54. See, e.g., Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO
(Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min
decl_trips_e.htm.
55. TPP, supra note 4, art. 18.6.
56. Id. art. 18.3.
